Board directors’ preferences – What are good aggregation rules?
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- Duran, Mihael, 2013. "Board directors' preferences: What are good aggregation rules?," University of Tuebingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance 57, University of Tuebingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences.
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- Duran, Mihael & Pull, Kerstin, 2014. "Der Beitrag der Arbeitnehmervertreter zur fachlichen und geschlechtlichen Diversitaet von Aufsichtsraeten: Erkenntnisse einer qualitativ-explorativen Analyse (Worker directors and supervisory board di," Industrielle Beziehungen - Zeitschrift fuer Arbeit, Organisation und Management - The German Journal of Industrial Relations, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 21(4), pages 329-351.
More about this item
KeywordsBoard of directors; Cheap talk; Heterogeneity; Multiple audiences;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
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