Game Theory-Based Minimization of the Ostracism Risk in Construction Companies

Strategic and managemerial decision-making in an organization can have a crucial effect for the whole entity; however, it rarely involves the organization’s employees evenly at the different organizational levels. The result is—what is addressed in this paper as—the ostracism risk, namely the risk accruing from the lack of satisfaction of underprivileged employees’ groups during the decision-making process. The ostracism risk could jeopardize the organization’s integrity and therefore requires effective treatment. This paper aims at verifying a conceptual approach, which is proposed as a methodology for assessing the probability of organizational cooperation when deciding under risk, thus minimizing ostracism risk. The proposed approach is based on organizational and human resources management (HRM) theories and is contextualized for construction through the understanding of systems theory. The proposed methodology presents a potential modelling via game theory of a medium-sized construction company that is organized according to Mintzberg’s organizational model. The utilization of the bounded Pareto distribution is presented as an approach of the model’s probabilistic processing, and the potential for estimating the probabilities to adopt a favorable cooperational decision is verified. The paper concludes with the reference to the next steps required for the methodology’s validation and further improvement.