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Coalition government or federalism? The relationship between policy distance and institutional design

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  • Takaharu ISHII

Abstract

This article explores how policy distance influences the choice between coalition governments and federal systems. It presents a theoretical framework supported by comparative political analysis to understand institutional design preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Takaharu ISHII, 2022. "Coalition government or federalism? The relationship between policy distance and institutional design," Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, EconSciences Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 131-151, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ4:v:9:y:2022:i:3:p:131-151
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 817-830, June.
    4. Lockwood, Ben, "undated". "Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralisation," Economic Research Papers 268795, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    6. Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997. "On the Formation of Political Coalitions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(2), pages 293-293, June.
    7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    8. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    9. Laver, Michael & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 873-890, September.
    10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
    11. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C. & Winer, Mark D., 1978. "The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 599-615, June.
    12. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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