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Citations for "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships"

by Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
  3. Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363.
  4. Plambeck, Erica L. & Taylor, Terry A., 2004. "Partnership in a Dynamic Production System," Research Papers 1892, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  5. Koppel, Oliver, 2004. "Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 309-314, December.
  6. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  7. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," UCLA Economics Working Papers 826, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Zhao, Rui R., 2012. "Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 964-983.
  9. Lucas Maestri, 2012. "Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 34-56, August.
  10. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 1996. "Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 163-169, August.
  11. Julian Dormann & Thomas Ehrmann & Michael Kopel, 2008. "Managing the Evolution of Cooperation," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-01, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  12. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 2013. "Breakdowns," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000635, David K. Levine.
  13. Pagès, H. & Possamai, D., 2012. "A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives," Working papers 378, Banque de France.
  14. Feigenberg, Benjamin & Field, Erica M. & Pande, Rohini, 2010. "Building Social Capital through Microfinance," Working Paper Series rwp10-019, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  15. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society.
  16. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Parent, Daniel, 2013. "Transactions Costs and the Employment Contract in the US Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 7306, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Galina Vereshchagina & Ayca Kaya, 2009. "Endogenous matching predictions in a repeated partnership model with imperfect monitoring," 2009 Meeting Papers 829, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  19. Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  20. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-97, October.
  21. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  22. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  23. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2000. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring and Uniform Sustainability," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-84, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  24. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  25. Zeng, Ming, 2003. "Managing the cooperative dilemma of joint ventures: the role of structural factors," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 95-113.
  26. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 0. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  27. Jussi Keppo & Giuseppe Moscarini & Lones Smith, 2005. "The Demand for Information: More Heat than Light," 2005 Meeting Papers 798, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  28. Asilis, Carlos M., 1995. "A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 245-251, February.
  29. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  30. Osório António M., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-27, April.
  31. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
  32. Serrano, Roberto & Zapater, Inigo, 1998. "The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 343-363, February.
  33. Brendan Daley & Brett Green, 2012. "Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1433-1504, 07.
  34. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, 1992. "Gatt, Dispute Settlement And Cooperation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 151-170, 07.
  35. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
  36. Sugaya, Takuo, 0. "Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  37. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Jean-Charles Rochet & StÈphane Villeneuve, 2010. "Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 73-118, 01.
  38. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6223, Paris Dauphine University.
  39. Zheng, Bingyong, 2008. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 406-416, May.
  40. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  41. Masaki Aoyagi, 2003. "Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," ISER Discussion Paper 0580, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  42. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2001. "The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  43. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
  44. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  45. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," 2005 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  46. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  47. Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
  48. Felix Kubler & Karl Schmedders, 2000. "Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks And Welfare," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 130, Society for Computational Economics.
  49. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
  50. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  51. Rida Laraki, 2010. "Explicit formulas for repeated games with absorbing states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 53-69, March.
  52. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  53. Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure," 2014 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  54. Wang, Chengsi & Zudenkova, Galina, 2014. "A Rationale for Non-Monotonic Group-Size Effect in Repeated Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 14-03, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  55. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices," Economics Working Paper Archive 555, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  56. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  57. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics.
  58. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  59. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  60. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
  61. Lee, Jeho & Park, Seung Ho & Ryu, Young & Baik, Yoon-Suk, 2010. "A hidden cost of strategic alliances under Schumpeterian dynamics," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 229-238, March.
  62. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  63. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2004. "Uncertainty of time intervals and possibility of collusion in infinitely repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 355-358, June.
  64. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-49, February.
  65. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
  66. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
  67. Furusawa, Taiji, 1999. "The negotiation of sustainable tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 321-345, August.
  68. Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2008. "The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 165-168, August.
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