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The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games

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  • Takizawa, Shinichiro

Abstract

The study of repeated games with Imperfect Public Information began with [Abreu, D., Pearce, D., Stacchetti, E., 1986. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 251-269] using dynamic decomposition and was settled in [Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., Maskin, E., 1994. The folk theorem with imperfect public information, Econometrica, 62, 997-1039]. However, we suggest that if the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered when punishment is exercised, the set of perfect public equilibria and their payoffs would change.

Suggested Citation

  • Takizawa, Shinichiro, 2008. "The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 165-168, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:165-168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0012 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1989. "Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 428-442, August.
    7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
    8. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    9. Gonzalo Cortazar & Eduardo S. Schwartz & Marcelo Salinas, 1998. "Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1059-1070, August.
    10. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
    11. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
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