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The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games

  • Takizawa, Shinichiro
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    The study of repeated games with Imperfect Public Information began with [Abreu, D., Pearce, D., Stacchetti, E., 1986. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 251-269] using dynamic decomposition and was settled in [Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., Maskin, E., 1994. The folk theorem with imperfect public information, Econometrica, 62, 997-1039]. However, we suggest that if the effect of uncertainty and irreversibility are considered when punishment is exercised, the set of perfect public equilibria and their payoffs would change.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(07)00275-3
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 165-168

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:165-168
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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    1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1989. "Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 428-442, August.
    2. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
    3. Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997. "Information and timing in repeated partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 636, David K. Levine.
    4. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
    5. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
    6. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    9. Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
    10. Gonzalo Cortazar & Eduardo S. Schwartz & Marcelo Salinas, 1998. "Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1059-1070, August.
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