Managing the cooperative dilemma of joint ventures: the role of structural factors
This paper first argues that joint venture partners face a "cooperative dilemma" in managing the inherent tension between cooperation and competition, and then, drawing from the game theory literature, explores various structural factors that improve partner cooperation. Empirical analysis shows that better protection of one's own contribution to joint ventures, similarity in partners' organizational cultures or management styles, and continuous reliance on future contribution from partners led to a higher degree of cooperation among partners, while the difficulties in evaluating partner's performance and the higher degree of asymmetry in partners' specialized investments in joint ventures led to a lower degree of cooperation.
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Volume (Year): 9 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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