Strategy-contingent discounting in repeated PD-games
No abstract is available for this item.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Seabright, Paul, 1994.
"Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
- Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 1996. "Infinitely-repeated games with endogenous discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 163-169, August.
- David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988.
"Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:85:y:2004:i:3:p:309-314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.