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Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament

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Cited by:

  1. Fu, Qiang & Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013. "Communication and commitment in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-19.
  2. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 679-688, December.
  3. Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019. "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 419-433.
  4. Parimal Kanti Bag & Nona Pepito, 2012. "Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1257-1286, November.
  5. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2015. "The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 521-569.
  6. Gershkov, Alex & Perry, Motty, 2009. "Tournaments with midterm reviews," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 162-190, May.
  7. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2011. "Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1416-1429.
  8. List, John A. & Rasul, Imran, 2011. "Field Experiments in Labor Economics," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 2, pages 103-228, Elsevier.
  9. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2016. "Head starts in dynamic tournaments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 94-97.
  10. Azmat, Ghazala & Iriberri, Nagore, 2010. "The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(7-8), pages 435-452, August.
  11. Fu, Qiang & Jiao, Qian & Lu, Jingfeng, 2014. "Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 376-380.
  12. Galina Besstremyannaya & Sergei Golovan, 2019. "Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race," CINCH Working Paper Series 1903, Universitaet Duisburg-Essen, Competent in Competition and Health.
  13. Sandra Schneemann & Christian Deutscher, 2017. "Intermediate Information, Loss Aversion, And Effort: Empirical Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1759-1770, October.
  14. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2017. "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 199-224.
  15. Cédric Gutierrez & Tomasz Obloj & Douglas H. Frank, 2021. "Better to have led and lost than never to have led at all? Lost leadership and effort provision in dynamic tournaments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 774-801, April.
  16. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
  17. Gwen-Jiro Clochard & Guillaume Hollard & Julia Wirtz, 2022. "More effort or better technologies? On the effect of relative performance feedback," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 22/767, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  18. Ederer, Florian & Fehr, Ernst, 2007. "Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 3200, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  19. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
  20. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
  21. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2015. "Do polls create momentum in political competition?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-14.
  22. Fischer, Mira & Sliwka, Dirk, 2018. "Confidence in knowledge or confidence in the ability to learn: An experiment on the causal effects of beliefs on motivation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 122-142.
  23. Julia Nafziger & Heiner Schumacher, 2013. "Information Management and Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 140-163, March.
  24. Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
  25. Eisenkopf, Gerald & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "Stop watching and start listening! The impact of coaching and peer observation in tournaments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 56-70.
  26. Terstiege, Stefan, 2014. "Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 341-344.
  27. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.
  28. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
  29. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," PIER Working Paper Archive 23-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  30. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
  31. Kvaløy, Ola & Schöttner, Anja, 2015. "Incentives to motivate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 26-42.
  32. Matthias Kräkel, 2014. "Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments revisited," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 77-91, April.
  33. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2013. "Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Campaigns?," Economics Working Paper Series 1326, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  34. Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang & Yan Huang & Damian R. Beil, 2022. "The Role of Feedback in Dynamic Crowdsourcing Contests: A Structural Empirical Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4858-4877, July.
  35. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  36. Gürtler, Oliver & Harbring, Christine, 2007. "Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 219, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  37. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu, 2020. "On Equilibrium Player Ordering In Dynamic Team Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1830-1844, October.
  38. Ludwig, Sandra & Lünser, Gabriele K., 2012. "Observing your competitor – The role of effort information in two-stage tournaments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 166-182.
  39. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 150-182, February.
  40. Bo Chen & Bo Chen & Dmitriy Knyazev, 2022. "Information disclosure in dynamic research contests," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 113-137, March.
  41. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2017. "Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Discussion Papers 36, Meisei University, School of Economics.
  42. Grossmann, Martin & Hottiger, Dieter, 2020. "Liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  43. Klein, Arnd Heinrich & Schmutzler, Armin, 2013. "Intertemporal Effort Provision in Sequential Tournaments," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79973, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  44. Johannes Berger & Petra Nieken, 2016. "Heterogeneous Contestants and the Intensity of Tournaments," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 17(7), pages 631-660, October.
  45. Daniel P. Gross, 2017. "Performance feedback in competitive product development," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 438-466, May.
  46. Ján Zábojník, 2014. "Subjective evaluations with performance feedback," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 341-369, June.
  47. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2022. "To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8144-8165, November.
  48. Benoît S. Y. Crutzen & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2013. "Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 744-767, December.
  49. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Managing performance evaluation systems: Relational incentives in the presence of learning-by-shirking," Working Papers 2018-12, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
  50. Sandra Ludwig, 2012. "Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 341-355, December.
  51. Raymond, C. & Shvets, J., 2022. "Rank vs Money: Evidence from Managers," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2256, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  52. Iván Marinovic, 2015. "The Credibility of Performance Feedback in Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 165-188, March.
  53. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2014. "Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-13.
  54. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
  55. Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure," 2014 Meeting Papers 314, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  56. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  57. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
  58. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
  59. Jürgen Mihm & Jochen Schlapp, 2019. "Sourcing Innovation: On Feedback in Contests," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 559-576, February.
  60. Marco Serena, 2022. "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 763-792, October.
  61. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
  62. Stav Yanovsky & Nicholas Hoernle & Omer Lev & Kobi Gal, 2021. "One size does not fit all: A study of badge behavior in stack overflow," Journal of the Association for Information Science & Technology, Association for Information Science & Technology, vol. 72(3), pages 331-345, March.
  63. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.
  64. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  65. Jungwon Min, 2022. "Effects of Mixed-Gender Competition: Choking under Pressure in a Dynamic Tournament," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(8), pages 1-14, April.
  66. Juncai Jiang & Yu Wang, 2020. "A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(2), pages 481-500, February.
  67. Brendan Daley & Ruoyu Wang, 2018. "When to Release Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(1), pages 11-26, March.
  68. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
  69. Kimmy Wa Chan & Stella Yiyan Li & Jian Ni & John JianJun Zhu, 2021. "What Feedback Matters? The Role of Experience in Motivating Crowdsourcing Innovation," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(1), pages 103-126, January.
  70. Rieck, Thomas, 2010. "Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 16/2010, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  71. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2017. "Beeps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 31-53, January.
  72. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.
  73. Marino, Anthony M. & Ozbas, Oguzhan, 2014. "Disclosure of status in an agency setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 191-207.
  74. Jan Zabojnik, 2011. "Subjective Evaluations With Performance Feedback," Working Paper 1283, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  75. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
  76. Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations," Working Papers 490, Barcelona School of Economics.
  77. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2020. "Information feedback in relative grading: Evidence from a field experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
  78. Bergerhoff, Jan & Vosen, Agnes, 2015. "Can being behind get you ahead? Reference Dependence and Asymmetric Equilibria in an Unfair Tournament," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 03/2015, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  79. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.
  80. Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2006. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001229, UCLA Department of Economics.
  81. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
  82. Katolnik, Svetlana & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2014. "On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100574, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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