Intertemporal Effort Provision in Sequential Tournaments
This paper analyzes intertemporal effort provision in two-stage tournaments. A principal with a fixed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. He observes noisy signals of effort in both periods. His goal is to maximize either total efforts (perfect substitutes) or the product of first- and second-period efforts (imperfect substitutes). He decides (i) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second period prize, (ii) how to spread prize money across the two periods, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. Under very general conditions, the principal puts positive weight on both periods in period two. Furthermore, he sets no first-period prize provided the observations in period one are too noisy. The information revelation policy depends on the third derivative of the effort cost function.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.socialpolitik.org/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gershkov, Alex & Perry, Motty, 2009.
"Tournaments with midterm reviews,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 162-190, May.
- Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2006. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001229, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2006. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews," Discussion Paper Series dp414, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Gershkov, Alex & Perry, Motty, 2006. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 145, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2003.
"Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0580, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Meyer, Margaret A, 1992.
"Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret A. MEYER, 1992. "Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 25-26, pages 165-187.
- Florian Ederer, 2010. "Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 733-769, 09.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79973. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.