On the Incentive Effect of Job Rotation
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More about this item
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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