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Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Shinya Kajitani
  • Keiichi Morimoto

    (Department of Economics, Meisei University)

  • Shiba Suzuki

    (Faculty of Economics, Seikei University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the feedback of performance information and effort input by students under a relative grading scheme. By conducting a randomized experiment in an economics course at a Japanese university, we demonstrate that relative performance information feedback improves the performance of students with only intermediate scores in the midterm examination, but worsens the performance of high-scoring students. A theoretical interpretation suggests that a decrease in uncertainty in the relative ability of students is responsible, which we refer to as "just-pass" behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2017. "Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Discussion Papers 36, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mei:wpaper:36
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Brade, Raphael & Himmler, Oliver & Jäckle, Robert, 2018. "Normatively Framed Relative Performance Feedback – Field Experiment and Replication," MPRA Paper 88830, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    education; experiment; relative performance information feedback; tournaments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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