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Frequency Of Examinations And Student Achievement In A Randomized Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Maria De Poala

  • Vincenzo Scoppa

    (Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica, Università della Calabria)

Abstract

We carry out a randomized experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled at an Italian University attending an introductory economics class to evaluate the impact on achievement of examination frequency and interim feedback provision. Students in the treated group were allowed to undertake an intermediate exam and were informed about the results obtained, while students in the control group could only take the final exam. It emerges that students undertaking the intermediate exam perform better both in terms of probability of passing the exams and of grades obtained. High ability students appear to benefit more from the treatment. The experiment design allows us to disentangle “workload division or commitment” effects from “feedback provision” effects. We find that the estimated treatment impact is due exclusively to the first effect, while the feedback provision has no positive effect on performance. Finally, the better performance of treated students in targeted examinations seems not to be obtained at the expenses of results earned in other examinations.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria De Poala & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2010. "Frequency Of Examinations And Student Achievement In A Randomized Experiment," Working Papers 201019, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
  • Handle: RePEc:clb:wpaper:201019
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    Cited by:

    1. Marianne Bernatzky & Jos Mar a Cabrera & Alejandro Cid, 2017. "Frequency of testing Lessons from a field experiment in higher education," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1703, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    2. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2019. "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 74-90.
    3. Damgaard, Mette Trier & Nielsen, Helena Skyt, 2018. "Nudging in education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 313-342.
    4. Belayet Hossain & Panagiotis Tsigaris, 2015. "Are grade expectations rational? A classroom experiment," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 199-212, April.
    5. Antonello E. Scorcu & Laura Vici, 2013. "Economic and cultural factors and illegal copying in the university textbook market," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-01-2013, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Feb 2013.
    6. Damgaard, Mette Trier, 2021. "A decade of nudging: What have we learned?," Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift, Nationaløkonomisk Forening, vol. 2021(1), pages 1-21.
    7. Nicholas A. Wright & Puneet Arora & Jesse Wright, 2024. "I Promise to Work Hard: The Impact of a Non-Binding Commitment Pledge on Academic Performance," Working Papers 2411, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    8. Onji, Kazuki, 2013. "Estimating the effects of procrastination on performance: A small sample study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-90.
    9. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2015. "Are females scared of competing with males? Results from a field experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 117-128.
    10. Kooreman, Peter, 2013. "Rational students and resit exams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 213-215.
    11. Gianluca Argentin & Aline Pennisi & Daniele Vidoni & Giovanni Abbiati & Andrea Caputo, 2014. "Trying to Raise (Low) Math Achievement and to Promote (Rigorous) Policy Evaluation in Italy: Evidence From a Large-Scale Randomized Trial," Evaluation Review, , vol. 38(2), pages 99-132, April.
    12. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2017. "Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Discussion Papers 36, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    13. De Paola, Maria & Lombardo, Rosetta & Pupo, Valeria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2021. "Do Women Shy Away from Public Speaking? A Field Experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Mette T. Damgaard, 2020. "A decade of nudging: What have we learned?," Economics Working Papers 2020-07, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    15. Kooreman, Peter, 2012. "Rational Students and Resit Exams," IZA Discussion Papers 6832, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Bratti, Massimiliano & Granato, Silvia & Havari, Enkelejda, 2026. "Another chance: Number of exam retakes and university students’ outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    17. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
    18. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2020. "Information feedback in relative grading: Evidence from a field experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    19. Aina, Carmen & Aktaş, Koray & Casalone, Giorgia, 2024. "Effects of workload allocation per course on students’ academic outcomes: Evidence from STEM degrees," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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