IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp6832.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rational Students and Resit Exams

Author

Listed:
  • Kooreman, Peter

    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

Resit exams – extra opportunities to do an exam in the same academic year – are widely prevalent in European higher education, but uncommon in the US. I present a simple theoretical model to compare rational student behavior in the case of only one exam opportunity versus the case of two exam opportunities. Numerical examples for a wide range of plausible parameter values show that a second exam opportunity increases the ultimate passing probability only slightly, but strongly reduces average total student effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Kooreman, Peter, 2012. "Rational Students and Resit Exams," IZA Discussion Papers 6832, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6832
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp6832.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2011. "Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1416-1429.
    2. Edward P. Lazear, 2006. "Speeding, Terrorism, and Teaching to the Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(3), pages 1029-1061.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Resit exams are a bad idea
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-10-24 19:32:00

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kooreman, Peter, 2013. "Rational students and resit exams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 213-215.
    2. Nicholas A. Wright & Puneet Arora & Jesse Wright, 2024. "I Promise to Work Hard: The Impact of a Non-Binding Commitment Pledge on Academic Performance," Working Papers 2411, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    3. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2015. "Are females scared of competing with males? Results from a field experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 117-128.
    4. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2020. "Information feedback in relative grading: Evidence from a field experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    5. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2008. "A signalling model of school grades: centralized versus decentralized examinations," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0025, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
    6. Dai, Zhixin & Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 146-162.
    7. Zakharov, Andrey & Carnoy, Martin, 2021. "Does teaching to the test improve student learning?," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    8. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    9. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
    10. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.
    11. Marianne Bernatzky & José María Cabrera & Alejandro Cid, 2017. "Frequency of testing Lessons from a field experiment in higher education," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1703, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    12. Bryson, Alex & Buraimo, Babatunde & Simmons, Rob, 2011. "Do salaries improve worker performance?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 424-433, August.
    13. De Paola, Maria & Lombardo, Rosetta & Pupo, Valeria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2021. "Do Women Shy Away from Public Speaking? A Field Experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Jason Brown & Mark Duggan & Ilyana Kuziemko & William Woolston, 2014. "How Does Risk Selection Respond to Risk Adjustment? New Evidence from the Medicare Advantage Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3335-3364, October.
    15. Derek Neal & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010. "Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 263-283, May.
    16. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski & Aleksandar B. Todorov, 2022. "Foundations of Contemporary Economics: Edward P. Lazear and Personnel Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 671-691.
    17. Jeffrey Wagner, 2021. "Optimal deterrence under misperception of the probability of apprehension and the magnitude of sanctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 2080-2088.
    18. Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer, 2018. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(4), pages 819-854, December.
    19. Hogarth, Robin M. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Ambiguous incentives and the persistence of effort: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-19.
    20. Samuel Kapon & Lucia Del Carpio & Sylvain Chassang, 2024. "Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve Tax Collection," Working Papers 335, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6832. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.