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Tailored Feedback and Worker Green Behavior: Field Evidence from Bus Drivers

Author

Listed:
  • Adriaan (A.R.) Soetevent

    (University of Groningen, The Netherlands; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands)

  • Gert-Jan Romensen

    (University of Groningen, The Netherlands;)

Abstract

How to engage workers in conservation efforts when the company pays the bill? In a field experiment with 409 bus drivers, we investigate the potential of targeted peer-comparison feedback and on-the-road coaching. Drivers receive individualized reports with peer-comparison messages on multiple driving dimensions. In addition, coaches quasi randomly provide drivers with in person coaching moments on the bus. Based on 800,000 trip-level observations, we find that the targeted peer-comparison treatments do not improve driving. On-the-road coaching significantly improves driving on multiple dimensions but only temporarily. Further analysis reveals negative interaction effects between the two programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriaan (A.R.) Soetevent & Gert-Jan Romensen, 2017. "Tailored Feedback and Worker Green Behavior: Field Evidence from Bus Drivers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-073/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170073
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    peer comparisons; coaching; worker motivation; fuel conservation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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