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Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment

  • Christiane Bradler
  • Robert Dur
  • Susanne Neckermann
  • Arjan Non

This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2013/wp-cesifo-2013-03/cesifo1_wp4164.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4164.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4164
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