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Awards At Work

Listed author(s):
  • Susanne Neckermann
  • Reto Cueni
  • Bruno S. Frey

Behavioral economics documents the importance of status and self-image concerns in the workplace, but is largely silent about how to instrumentalize them to induce effort. Awards|widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere are motivators that derive their value from such social concerns. Panel data from the call center of a large international bank allow us to estimate the impact of receiving an award on e ort. The performance of winners proves to be signi cantly higher than that of comparable nonrecipients after the award has been presented. This increase in work e ort is sizeable, robust, and not driven by reverse causation.

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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2009-09.

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Date of creation: May 2009
Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2009-09
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