Intentions for Doing Good Matter for Doing Well: The (Negative) Signaling Value of Prosocial Incentives
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More about this item
Keywordsprosocial incentives; Corporate Social Responsibility; signaling;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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