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Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

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  • Terstiege, Stefan

Abstract

I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.

Suggested Citation

  • Terstiege, Stefan, 2014. "Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 341-344.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:341-344
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Performance evaluation; Principal–agent; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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