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Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Korok Ray, 2007. "Performance Evaluations and Efficient Sorting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 839-882, September.
  2. Henneberger, Fred & Sousa-Poza, Alfonso, 2002. "Beweggründe und Determinanten zwischenbetrieblicher Mobilität: Die Schweiz in einer internationalen Perspektive (Motives and determinants of job-to-job mobility : Switzerland in an international persp," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 35(2), pages 205-231.
  3. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2000. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0021, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. K. Sonin & I. Khovanskaya & M. Yudkevich., 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
  5. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
  6. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
  7. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2010. "The Layoff Rat Race," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(1), pages 185-210, March.
  8. Sergey V. Popov, 2015. "Tenure-track contract helps self-selection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2482-2486.
  9. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Gaston, Noel, 2004. "Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 599-622, October.
  10. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
  11. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
  12. Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2006. "Individual and collective determinants of academic scientists' productivity," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, March.
  13. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 201-229.
  14. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017. "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(9), pages 2695-2730, September.
  15. Mohrenweiser, Jens & Wydra-Sommaggio, Gaby & Zwick, Thomas, 2015. "Work-related ability as source of information advantages of training employers," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-057, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  16. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  17. Glazer, Amihai, 2012. "Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 432-438.
  18. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  19. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 469-490.
  20. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2004. "The effects of a consolation match on the promotion tournament," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 264-281, June.
  21. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  22. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
  23. Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
  24. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  25. Barlevy, Gadi & Neal, Derek, 2016. "Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets," Working Paper Series WP-2016-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  26. Felipe Balmaceda & Paola Sevilla, "undated". "Invirtiendo en Entrenamiento General: El Programa de Formación Dual," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv136, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  27. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 2002. "Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1153-1185, July.
  28. Haroon Mumtaz, 2017. "Does uncertainty affect real activity? Evidence from state-level," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  29. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
  30. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2017. "Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11869, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2012. "Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 13-33, September.
  33. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00179 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Peter Hoeschler & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2017. "The Relative Importance of Personal Characteristics for the Hiring of Young Workers," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0142, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), revised Jan 2018.
  35. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2017. "Dynamic Performance Evaluation with Deadlines: The Role of Commitment," ISER Discussion Paper 1015, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  36. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
  37. Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "The optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 549-573.
  38. Michael Waldman & Ori Zax, 2016. "An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-149.
  39. Núria Rodríquez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  40. Demougin, Dominique & Siow, Aloysius, 1996. "Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 1483-1499, August.
  41. Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand, 2014. "Active Improvement Management of by Patterns of Active Thinking," Case Studies in Business and Management, Macrothink Institute, vol. 1(1), pages 1-22, June.
  42. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
  43. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325.
  44. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
  45. Cassidy, Hugh & DeVaro, Jed & Kauhanen, Antti, 2016. "Promotion signaling, gender, and turnover: New theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 140-166.
  46. Jens Mohrenweiser & Gabriele Wydra-Somaggio & Thomas Zwick, 2017. "Information Advantages of Training Employers Despite Credible Training Certificates," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0121, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), revised Apr 2017.
  47. Elena Pastorino & Braz Camargo, 2005. "Dynamic Screening: A Role for Up-or-Out Contracts," 2005 Meeting Papers 766, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  48. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2016. "Learning-by-Employing: The Value of Commitment under Uncertainty," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(3), pages 581-620.
  49. Lalith Munasinghe & Brendan O'Flaherty, 2005. "Specific Training Sometimes Cuts Wages and Always Cuts Turnover," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 213-234, April.
  50. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high-powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316.
  52. Rosemary Walker, 2005. "Empirical analysis of up-or-out rules for promotion policies," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 29(2), pages 172-186, June.
  53. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  54. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
  55. repec:bla:stratm:v:38:y:2017:i:9:p:1848-1874 is not listed on IDEAS
  56. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-519, July.
  57. Ying Wu, 2003. "Substitution between wages and on-the-job training in an optimal labor contract," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 369-383.
  58. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  59. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
  60. Robert Gibbons, 1996. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  61. Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino, 2012. "Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment under uncertainty," Staff Report 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  62. Chen, Zhao & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2009. "Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 300-308, March.
  63. Kevin Lang & Russell Weinstein, 2016. "A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers," NBER Working Papers 22387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  64. DeVaro, Jed, 2011. "Using "opposing responses" and relative performance to distinguish empirically among alternative models of promotions," MPRA Paper 35175, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  65. Nicolas Carayol, 2003. "The incentive properties of the Matthew Effect in the academic competition," Working Papers of BETA 2003-11, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  66. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
  67. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 2007. "Esteem and ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 373-383, July.
  68. Lisa B. Kahn, 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 165-205, October.
  69. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
  70. repec:iab:iabmit:v:35:i:2:p:205-231 is not listed on IDEAS
  71. Prasad, Suraj & Tran, Hien, 2013. "Work practices, incentives for skills, and training," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 66-76.
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