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Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement

Author

Listed:
  • Heisz, Andrew
  • Oreopoulos, Philip

Abstract

Dans un cadre ou la formation et les perspectives d'avancement dependent des previsions initiales de competence, les effets sur les salaires des signaux de competence initiale peuvent se manifester bien au-dela de la periode ou l'on connait bien les qualites d'un travailleur. Ce document propose d'etendre les analyses recentes de signaux pour mieux tenir compte des differences de formation en utilisant les caracteristiques des entreprises et en appliquant les criteres d'analyse a un grand echantillon de titulaires de maitrise en administration des affaires et de diplome en droit d'ecoles de rang divers.

Suggested Citation

  • Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "Importance des signaux de competence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des etudes analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques.
  • Handle: RePEc:stc:stcp3f:2006236f
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    References listed on IDEAS

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