Up or Out Rules in the Market for Lawers
The authors examine how up-or-out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers. Using data on large New York law firms, they show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high. A newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise. Firm growth therefore contributes between 5-7 percent of the present value of profits of a law firm. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
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|Date of creation:||1990|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTER, NORC, CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://economics.uchicago.edu/research.shtml
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dominique Demougin & Aloysius Siow, 1992. "Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 2, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Abowd, John M & Card, David, 1989.
"On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes,"
Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 411-445, March.
- John M. Abowd & David Card, 1986. "On the Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes," NBER Working Papers 1832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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