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Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection

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  • Popov, Sergey V

Abstract

Tenure contract is criticized for curbing the incentives for spending effort after obtaining the tenured status. Yet, the best faculty seems to work on a tenure contract, and schools who employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer a tenure-track contract to their new hires. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.

Suggested Citation

  • Popov, Sergey V, 2015. "Tenure-Track Contract Helps Self-Selection," MPRA Paper 63018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:63018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, 1999. "Tenure Issues in Higher Education," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 85-98, Winter.
    2. Sharon M. Oster & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1998. "Aging And Productivity Among Economists," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 154-156, February.
    3. Bruce Cater & Byron Lew & Marcus Pivato, 2017. "The Efficiency of Tenure Contracts in Academic Employment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(2), pages 331-361, April.
    4. Benjamin Jones & E.J. Reedy & Bruce A. Weinberg, 2014. "Age and Scientific Genius," NBER Working Papers 19866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988. "Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-444, October.
    6. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-472, June.
    7. McPherson, Michael S. & Winston, Gordon C., 1983. "The economics of academic tenure : A relational perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2-3), pages 163-184.
    8. Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-441, September.
    9. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Muhammad Asali, 2019. "A tale of two tracks," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 323-337, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tenure; academia; job market; self-selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets

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