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University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation

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  • Willam O. Brown

Abstract

This paper provides an efficiency-based explanation for several features of university governance including academic tenure. In this model, tenure is part of a broader system of organizational governance where the non-profit status of the university requires faculty members to evaluate and monitor both university administrators and trustees. The nature of the employment contract provides the incentives for the faculty to behave as residual claimants. Tenure is necessary for faculty to be willing to assume the roles normally associated with ownership without fear or reprisal from trustees and administrators.

Suggested Citation

  • Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-441, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199709)153:3_441:ugaata_2.0.tx_2-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Egon Franck & Torsten Pudack & Christian Opitz, 2001. "Zur Funktion von Topmanagement-Beratungen als Karrieresprungsbrett für High Potentials," Working Papers 0003, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    2. Guillaume Biot-Paquerot & Jean-Luc Rossignol, 2006. "Performance Management In The Public Sector:," Post-Print hal-00137200, HAL.
    3. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2007. "Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, pages 55-69.
    4. Kanniainen, Vesa & Keuschnigg, Christian, 2003. "The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 521-534, November.
    5. Glazer, A. & Kanniainen, V., 2000. "Term Length and the Quality of Appointments," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 485, Department of Economics.
    6. William O. Brown, Jr., "undated". "Faculty Participation in University Governance and the Effects on University Performance," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-25, Claremont Colleges.
    7. Heining, Jörg & Jerger, Jürgen & Lingens, Jörg, 2007. "Success in the Academic Labour Market for Economics - The German Experience," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 422, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
    8. Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume, 2006. "Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université
      [Democratic paradox and governance mediums: the case of university boards]
      ," MPRA Paper 2302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Dnes, Antony W. & Seaton, Jonathan S., 1998. "The reform of academic tenure in the United Kingdom," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, pages 491-509.
    10. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1716 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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