Performance Management In The Public Sector:
Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. At the beginning of the year 2006, the public sector reform will tend to impose performance measurements of research and educational activities, in order to improve organizational efficiency. The aim of this reform in the French context is to provide driving elements to increase internal efficiency, social and economic impact of higher education system and to reinforce international attractiveness of public education institutions. The substitution of resources management by result management involves an agent's performance responsibility measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is articulated with incentives system. The weakening of the property right system drives project bearers to maximize their utility instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding of individual strategies permits to understand constraints of management within universities, and to take into account the impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation process. The major risk is to constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing their burden and their motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of projects, and as well, the decreasing of university investments.
|Date of creation:||20 Mar 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in EAA, Mar 2006, Dublin, Ireland. 2006|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00137200|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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