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Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents

  • Francis Bloch

    ()

  • Nicolas Houy

    ()

This paper analyzes the assignment of durable objects to successive generations of agents who live for two periods. The optimal assignment rule is stationary, favors old agents and is determined by a selectivity function, which satisfies an iterative functional differential equation. More patient social planners are more selective, as are social planners facing distributions of types with higher probabilities for higher types. The paper also characterizes optimal assignment rules when monetary transfers are allowed and agents face a recovery cost, when multiple agents enter society, and when agents can invest to improve their types. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-011-0616-8
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 13-33

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:1:p:13-33
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  1. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988. "Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-44, October.
  3. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
  4. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 1-25, January.
  5. S. Christian Albright, 1974. "Optimal Sequential Assignments with Random Arrival Times," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 60-67, September.
  6. Cyrus Derman & Gerald J. Lieberman & Sheldon M. Ross, 1972. "A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(7), pages 349-355, March.
  7. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  8. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June.
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