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Trust in the monetary authority

  • Bursian, Dirk
  • Faia, Ester

Trust in policy makers uctuates signi cantly over the cycle and a¤ects the transmission mechanism. Despite this it is absent from the literature. We build a monetary model embedding trust cycles; the latter emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon of a game-theoretic interaction between atomistic agents and the monetary authority. Trust a¤ects agentsstochastic discount factors, namely the price of future risk, and through this it interacts with the monetary trans- mission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys we analyze the link between trust and the transmission mechanism of macro and monetary shocks: empirical results are in line with theoretical ones.

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Paper provided by Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt in its series SAFE Working Paper Series with number 14.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:14
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  1. Terui, N. & van Dijk, H.K., 1999. "Combined forecasts from linear and nonlinear time series models," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9949-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  2. Matteo Ciccarelli & Angela Maddaloni & Jose Luis Peydro, 2015. "Trusting the Bankers: A New Look at the Credit Channel of Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 979-1002, October.
  3. Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 1492, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Pesaran, H. Hashem & Shin, Yongcheol, 1998. "Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-29, January.
  5. Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari, 2009. "Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 979-1005, June.
  6. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel & Gürkaynak, Refet S. & Swanson, Eric, 2007. "Convergence and anchoring of yield curves in the euro area," Working Paper Series 0817, European Central Bank.
  7. Rudebusch, Glenn D., 2002. "Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1161-1187, September.
  8. Koop, Gary & Pesaran, M. Hashem & Potter, Simon M., 1996. "Impulse response analysis in nonlinear multivariate models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 119-147, September.
  9. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-59, November.
  10. Gaffeo, Edoardo & Petrella, Ivan & Pfajfar, Damjan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2014. "Loss Aversion and the Asymmetric Transmission of Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 10105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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