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Aversions to Trust

Author

Listed:
  • Anne CORCOS

    (Université de Picardie & LEM-Université de Paris 2)

  • François PANNEQUIN

    (Econole Normale Supérieure de Cachan & Centre de la Sorbonne)

  • Sacha BOURGEOIS-GIRONDE

    (LEM - Université de Paris 2)

Abstract

In this article, we focus on two types of “aversion” which we deem essential aspects of the notion of trust: betrayal aversion (social) and ambiguity aversion (a special case of aversion to uncertainty). Based on trust-games studies in experimental economics and neuroeconomics, our main goal is to assess the conceptual, behavioral and neurobiological connections between betrayal and ambiguity aversions. From a social and individual psychological point of view the bottom line of our trusting behavior could be our general aversion to ambiguous signals. We approach social trust in the terms of a phenomenon based on uncertainty aversion. Specifically, a reduction of the perceived uncertainty of a social interaction tends to build up a trusting climate conducive to trade by decreasing betrayal aversion. We hypothesize that betrayal aversion and ambiguity aversion bear such a negative correlation. Focusing on this potential negative correlation our approach clearly differs from more positive accounts of trust centred on altruism.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne CORCOS & François PANNEQUIN & Sacha BOURGEOIS-GIRONDE, 2012. "Aversions to Trust," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2012038, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2012038
    Note: Special Issue : Trust and Decision through Neuro-Economics
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41714325
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics

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