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Links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy

Author

Listed:
  • Maciej Albinowski
  • Piotr Ciżkowicz
  • Andrzej Rzońca

Abstract

We analyse determinants of trust in the European Central Bank (ECB). Our main finding is that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in interest rates have an adverse effect on their trust in central bank. This result is in accordance with the 'lack-of-confidence shock' hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) and in contrast with the 'fundamental shock' hypothesis which implies positive effects of aggressive cuts for trust in the ECB. The result is robust to various changes in the modelling approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Maciej Albinowski & Piotr Ciżkowicz & Andrzej Rzońca, 2014. "Links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(25), pages 3090-3106, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:46:y:2014:i:25:p:3090-3106
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2014.922674
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timo Henckel & Gordon D. Menzies & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2013. "The Great Recession and the Two Dimensions of European Central Bank Credibility," CAMA Working Papers 2013-55, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Roman Horvath & Dominika Katuscakova, 2016. "Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(57), pages 5625-5638, December.
    3. Piotr Ciżkowicz & Andrzej Rzońca, 2015. "Inflation Targeting and its Discontents: The Case of Poland," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 65(supplemen), pages 107-122, December.
    4. Piotr Cizkowicz & Andrzej Rzonca & Andrzej Toroj, 2015. "In search for appropriate lower bound.Zero lower bound vs. positive lower bound under discretion and commitment," NBP Working Papers 215, Narodowy Bank Polski, Economic Research Department.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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