The impact of social value orientation and risk attitudes on trust and reciprocity
Prior experimental studies provide evidence that the levels of trust and reciprocity are highly susceptible to individuals' preferences towards payoffs, prior experience, capacity to learn more about personal characteristics of each other and social distance. The objective of this study is to examine whether social value orientation as developed by Griesinger and Livingston [Griesinger, D. W., & Livingston Jr., J. W. (1973). Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in experimental games. Behavioral Science, 18, 173-188] and Liebrand [Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behavior in an n-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239-264] and risk preferences can help to account for the variability of trust and trustworthiness. We use the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe [Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142] investment game to generate indices of trust and reciprocity. Prior to their participation in the investment game, all subjects participated in two other games. One is used to measure their social value orientation (a measure of other regarding behavior) and the second to measure risk attitudes. These variables are introduced as treatments in the analysis of the trust and reciprocity data. In addition to these preference related variables, gender is introduced to capture any differences between men and women which may not be encompassed by value orientation and risk attitudes. The statistical analysis indicates that the social value orientation measure significantly accounts for variation in trust and reciprocity. As well, the level of trust exhibited by an investor significantly affects the reciprocity of the responders and this measure of trust interacts with social value orientation. Individuals who are highly pro-social reciprocate more as the sender's trust increases, while those who are highly pro-self reciprocate less as the sender's trust increases. For this sample of participants, the gender variable does not capture any differences in the behavior of men and women that is not already reflected by the differences captured by their value orientations. Risk attitudes do not significantly account for variation in trusting behavior, except for the case where individuals have neither strongly pro-social nor pro-self social value orientations. In this case, more risk-seeking individuals are more trusting.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
- G. Bolton, 2010.
"A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
263, David K. Levine.
- Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
- Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Wilson, Rick K., 2004. "Is trust a risky decision?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 447-465, December.
- Mui, Vai-Lam, 1995.
"The economics of envy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 311-336, May.
- Ananish Chaudhuri & Lata Gangadharn, 2003. "Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 875, The University of Melbourne.
- Buckley, Neil & Mestelman, Stuart & Shehata, Mohamed, 2003.
"Subsidizing public inputs,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 819-846, March.
- Neil Buckley & Kenneth Chan & James Chowhan & Stuart Mestelman & Mohamed Shehata, 2001.
"Value Orientations, Income and Displacement Effects, and Voluntary Contributions,"
Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 183-195, October.
- Neil Buckley & Kenneth S. Chan & James Chowhan & Stuart Mestelman & Mohamed Shehata, 2000. "Value Orientations, Income and Displacement Effects, and Voluntary Contributions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-03, McMaster University.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
- Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003.
"Trust, Risk and Betrayal,"
Working Paper Series
rwp03-041, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- McCabe, Kevin A. & Rigdon, Mary L. & Smith, Vernon L., 2003. "Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 267-275, October.
- Fernando Aguiar & Pablo Brañas-Garza & Natalia Jiménez & Luis Miller, 2007.
"Are women expected to be more generous?,"
07/08, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2003. "Is fairness used instrumentally? Evidence from sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 467-489, August.
- Harvey James, 2002. "The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic Inquiries Into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness," Microeconomics 0202001, EconWPA.
- Sonnemans, Joep & Dijk, Frans van & Winden, Frans van, 2006. "On the dynamics of social ties structures in groups," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 187-204, April.
- M Perugini & J H W Tan & D J Zizzo, 2010.
"Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality,"
Economic Issues Journal Articles,
Economic Issues, vol. 15(1), pages 83-110, March.
- Perugini, Marco & Tan, Jonathan H. W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2005. "Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality," Discussion Papers 236, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001.
"Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869, August.
- Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," General Economics and Teaching 0303002, EconWPA.
- Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3d04q5sm, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- François Cochard & Phu Nguyen Van & Marc Willinger, 2004.
"Trusting Behavior in a Repeated Investment Game,"
- Becker, Gary S, 1974.
"A Theory of Social Interactions,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
- Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April.
- Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
- Nancy Buchan & Rachel Croson, 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 386-391, May.
- Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
- James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2006.
"When Are Women More Generous than Men?,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 587-598, October.
- James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2006. "When are Women More Generous than Men?," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Fellner, Gerlinde & Maciejovsky, Boris, 2007.
"Risk attitude and market behavior: Evidence from experimental asset markets,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 338-350, June.
- Gerlinde Fellner & Boris Maciejovsky, . "Risk Attitude and Market Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-34, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Oguzhan Dincer & Eric Uslaner, 2007.
"Trust and Growth,"
2007.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Charness, Gary B & Gneezy, Uri, 2007. "Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Investment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt428481s8, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Cox, James C., 2004. "How to identify trust and reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 260-281, February.
- Harrison, Glenn W., 1986. "An experimental test for risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 7-11.
- Ashraf, Nava & Bohnet, Iris & Piankov, Nikita, 2003.
"Is Trust a Bad Investment?,"
Working Paper Series
rwp03-047, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-45, July.
- James Jr., Harvey S., 2002. "The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 291-307, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:368-380. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.