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The Geometry of Distributional Preferences and a Non-Parametric Identification Approach

  • Rudolf Kerschbamer

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    This paper proposes a geometric delineation of distributional preference types and a non-parametric approach for their identification in a two-person context. It starts with a small set of assumptions on preferences and shows that this set (i) naturally results in a taxonomy of distributional archetypes that nests all empirically relevant types considered in previous work in economics and social psychology; and (ii) gives rise to a clean experimental test design that discriminates between archetypes according to core features of preferences rather than properties of specific modelling variants. As a by-product the test yields a two-dimensional index of preference intensity.

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    File URL: http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec2/repec/inn/wpaper/2013-25.pdf
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    Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2013-25.

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    Length: 63 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-25
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