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Implications of Trust, Fear, and Reciprocity for Modeling Economic Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • James C. Cox
  • Klarita Sadiraj
  • Vjollca Vjollca

Abstract

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.

Suggested Citation

  • James C. Cox & Klarita Sadiraj & Vjollca Vjollca, 2006. "Implications of Trust, Fear, and Reciprocity for Modeling Economic Behavior," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-10, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Jul 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-10
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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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