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Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams

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  • Loukas Balafoutas

    ()

  • Rudolf Kerschbamer

    ()

  • Martin Kocher

    ()

  • Matthias Sutter

    ()

Abstract

We compare experimentally the revealed distributional preferences of individuals and teams in allocation tasks. We find that teams are significantly more benevolent than individuals in the domain of disadvantageous inequality while the benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality is similar across decision makers. A consequence for the frequency of preference types is that while a substantial fraction of individuals is classified as inequality averse, this type disappears completely in teams. Spiteful types are markedly more frequent among individuals than among teams. On the other hand, by far more teams than individuals are classified as efficiency lovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Loukas Balafoutas & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Martin Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2013. "Revealed distributional preferences: Individuals vs. teams," Working Papers 2013-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2013-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?," Post-Print halshs-01077253, HAL.
    2. Greiff, Matthias & Ackermann, Kurt & Murphy, Ryan O., 2016. "The influences of social context on the measurement of distributional preferences," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145529, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Karen Evelyn Hauge & Ole Rogeberg, 2015. "Representing Others in a Public Good Game," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(3), pages 1-13, September.
    4. Micaela M. Kulesz & Dennis A. V. Dittrich, 2014. "It's not you, it's me: an experimental study of employers' wage setting behavior," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2128-2137.
    5. Fu, Qiang & Ke, Changxia & Tan, Fangfang, 2015. "“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 57-79.
    6. Martin G. Kocher & Odile Poulsen & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2017. "Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 659-678, March.
    7. He, Haoran & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Are group members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 111-124.
    8. Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2015. "The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric identification approach: The Equality Equivalence Test," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 85-103.
    9. Haoran He & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Are team members less inequality averse than individual decision makers?," Working Papers halshs-00996545, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Distributional Preferences; Social Preferences; Team Decisions; Individual Decisions; Stability of Preferences; Behavioral Economics; Experimental Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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