Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining
We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2012|
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"Learning By Doing In An Ambiguous Environment,"
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2006-29, McGill University, Department of Economics.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Sonia Laszlo, 2006. "Learning-by-Doing in an Ambiguous Environment," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-29, CIRANO.
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Sonia Laszlo, 2016. "Learning-by-Doing in an Ambiguous Environment," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-46, CIRANO.
- Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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