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Sovereign Default Risk and Firm Heterogeneity

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  • Cristina Arellano
  • Yan Bai
  • Luigi Bocola

Abstract

This paper measures the output costs of sovereign risk by combining a sovereign debt model with firm- and bank-level data. In our framework, an increase in sovereign risk lowers the price of government debt and has an adverse impact on banks’ balance sheets, disrupting banks’ ability to finance firms. Importantly, firms are not equally affected by these developments: those that have greater financing needs and borrow from banks that are more exposed to government debt cut their production the most in a debt crisis. We use Italian data to measure these firm-level elasticities and use them as empirical targets for estimating the structural model. In a counterfactual analysis, we find that heightened sovereign risk was responsible for one-third of the observed output decline during the Italian debt crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Arellano & Yan Bai & Luigi Bocola, 2017. "Sovereign Default Risk and Firm Heterogeneity," NBER Working Papers 23314, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benjamin Hébert & Jesse Schreger, 2017. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 3119-3145, October.
    2. Bahaj, Saleem A., 2014. "Systemic sovereign risk: macroeconomic implications in the euro area," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58110, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Viral V Acharya & Tim Eisert & Christian Eufinger & Christian Hirsch, 2018. "Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(8), pages 2855-2896.
    4. Yusuf Soner Baskaya & Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, 2016. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Evidence from 1999 Turkish Earthquake," NBER Working Papers 22335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2013. "Take the Short Route: How to Repay and Restructure Sovereign Debt with Multiple Maturities," NBER Working Papers 19717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Luigi Bocola & Alessandro Dovis, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Quantitative Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(12), pages 4343-4377, December.
    7. Luigi Bocola, 2016. "The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 879-926.
    8. Christopher L. House & Christian Proebsting & Linda L. Tesar, 2017. "Austerity in the Aftermath of the Great Recession," NBER Working Papers 23147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandria, George & Bai, Yan & Deng, Minjie, 2020. "Migration and sovereign default risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-22.
    2. Pablo D’Erasmo & Hernán Moscoso Boedo & María Pía Olivero & Máximo Sangiácomo, 2020. "Relationship Networks in Banking Around a Sovereign Default and Currency Crisis," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(3), pages 584-642, September.
    3. Sudipto Karmakar & Francisco Buera, 2017. "Real Effects of Financial Distress: The Role of Heterogeneity," 2017 Meeting Papers 1356, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Arellano, Cristina & Bai, Yan & Mihalache, Gabriel, 2018. "Default risk, sectoral reallocation, and persistent recessions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 182-199.
    5. Michal Szkup, . "Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Bocola, Luigi & Bornstein, Gideon & Dovis, Alessandro, 2019. "Quantitative sovereign default models and the European debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 20-30.
    7. Pablo D’Erasmo & Hernán Moscoso Boedo & María Pía Olivero & Máximo Sangiácomo, 0. "Relationship Networks in Banking Around a Sovereign Default and Currency Crisis," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 0, pages 1-59.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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