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History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt

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Abstract

Infrequent but turbulent overt sovereign defaults on domestic creditors are a ?for- gotten history? in macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which the government chooses optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives versus the social value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity, and risk-sharing. A rich feedback mechanism links debt issuance, the distribution of debt holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Eurozone data, the model is consistent with key long-run and debt-crisis statistics. Defaults are rare (1.2 percent frequency) and preceded by surging debt and spreads. Debt sells at the risk-free price most of the time, but the government?s lack of commitment reduces sustainable debt sharply.

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  • Pablo D'Erasmo & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2019. "History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt," Working Papers 19-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:19-31
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2019.31
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    Cited by:

    1. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2023. "Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings: Public Capital and Fiscal Constraint Tightness," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0323, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    2. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2021. "Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of a Default," Development Working Papers 475, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    3. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2024. "Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of Private or Official Debt Restructurings," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 72(1), pages 292-334, March.
    4. Minjie Deng, 2024. "Inequality, Taxation, and Sovereign Default Risk," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 217-249, April.
    5. Bernardo Guimaraes & Lucas Tumkus, 2020. "On the costs of sovereign default in quantitative models," Discussion Papers 2021, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    6. Farzana Alamgir & Alok Johri, 2022. "International Sovereign Spread Differences and the Poverty of Nations," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-06, McMaster University.
    7. Antonio Cusato Novelli, 2021. "Sovereign default, political instability and political fragmentation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 732-755, September.
    8. Alexandre, Michel & Silva, Thiago Christiano & Michalak, Krzysztof & Rodrigues, Francisco Aparecido, 2023. "Does the default pecking order impact systemic risk? Evidence from Brazilian data," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(3), pages 1379-1391.
    9. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2025. "Fiscal Consolidation and Sovereign Debt Restructurings," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0525, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    10. Cheng, Jiahui & Chang, Senfeng, 2025. "Rare disasters, local currency-denominated external debt and sovereign default risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 250(C).
    11. Tamon Asonuma & Hyungseok Joo, 2023. "Sovereign Defaults and Public Investment (Capital)," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1123, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    12. Olivier Accominotti & Thilo N H Albers & Kim Oosterlinck, 2024. "Selective Default Expectations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(6), pages 1979-2015.
    13. Mitchener, Kris & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century: Looking Backward, Looking Forward," CEPR Discussion Papers 15935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Demian Pouzo & Ignacio Presno, 2020. "Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default under Incomplete Markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 1297, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    15. Ghulam, Yaseen, 2025. "A further examination of sovereign domestic and external debt defaults," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    16. Roettger, Joost, 2019. "Discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with endogenous sovereign risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 44-66.
    17. Scholl, Almuth, 2024. "The politics of redistribution and sovereign default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    18. Hajer Dachraoui & Mounir Smida & Maamar Sebri, 2020. "Role of capital flight as a driver of sovereign bond spreads in Latin American countries," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 162, pages 15-33.

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    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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