IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed015/240.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Jesse Schreger

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

We estimate the causal effect of sovereign default on the equity returns of Argentine firms. We identify this effect by exploiting changes in the probability of Argentine sovereign default induced by legal rulings in the case of Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital. Because the legal rulings affected the probability of Argentina defaulting on its debt, independent of underlying economic conditions, these rulings allow us to study the effect of default on firm performance. Using both standard event study methods and a Rigobon (2003) heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy, we find that an increase in the probability of sovereign default causes a decline in the Argentine equity market. A 1% increase in the risk-neutral probability of default causes a 0.55% fall in an index of Argentine American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Extrapolating from these estimates, we conclude that the recent Argentine sovereign default episode caused a cumulative 33% drop in the ADR index from 2011 to 2014.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesse Schreger, 2015. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," 2015 Meeting Papers 240, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed015:240
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2015/paper_240.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 2005. "What Explains the Stock Market's Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1221-1257, June.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 59(2), pages 162-194, June.
    3. Arteta, Carlos & Hale, Galina, 2008. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 53-69, January.
    4. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    5. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    6. Kuttner, Kenneth N., 2001. "Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the Fed funds futures market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 523-544, June.
    7. Andrew K. Rose, 2006. "Size Really Doesn't Matter: In Search of a National Scale Effect," NBER Working Papers 12191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Gennaioli, Nicola & Martin, Alberto & Rossi, Stefano, 2018. "Banks, government Bonds, and Default: What do the data Say?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 98-113.
    9. Enrique G. Mendoza & Vivian Z. Yue, 2012. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 889-946.
    10. Emi Nakamura & Jón Steinsson, 2018. "High-Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Effect," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(3), pages 1283-1330.
    11. Gurkaynak, Refet S. & Sack, Brian & Wright, Jonathan H., 2007. "The U.S. Treasury yield curve: 1961 to the present," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2291-2304, November.
    12. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
    13. Jun Pan & Kenneth J. Singleton, 2008. "Default and Recovery Implicit in the Term Structure of Sovereign CDS Spreads," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2345-2384, October.
    14. Rigobon, Roberto & Sack, Brian, 2004. "The impact of monetary policy on asset prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1553-1575, November.
    15. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    16. Auguste, Sebastian & Dominguez, Kathryn M.E. & Kamil, Herman & Tesar, Linda L., 2006. "Cross-border trading as a mechanism for implicit capital flight: ADRs and the Argentine crisis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1259-1295, October.
    17. Nathan Foley‐Fisher & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2013. "U.S. Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(5), pages 967-975, August.
    18. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    19. Gita Gopinath & Brent Neiman, 2014. "Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 793-831, March.
    20. Ms. Christina Daseking & Mr. Atish R. Ghosh & Mr. Timothy D. Lane & Mr. Alun H. Thomas, 2005. "Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina," IMF Occasional Papers 2005/003, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
    22. Luigi Bocola, 2016. "The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(4), pages 879-926.
    23. Roberto Rigobon, 2003. "Identification Through Heteroskedasticity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 777-792, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Trebesch, Christoph & Zabel, Michael, 2017. "The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 416-432.
    2. Marchesi, Silvia & Masi, Tania, 2021. "Life after default. Private and official deals," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    3. Silvia Marchesi, 2016. "Life after default? Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings," Development Working Papers 398, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 26 Aug 2016.
    4. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Karataş, Bilge, 2023. "Three sisters: The interlinkage between sovereign debt, currency, and banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    5. Filippo Brutti & Philip Sauré, 2016. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 145-174.
    6. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    7. Habib, Michel & Collard, Fabrice & Rochet, Jean Charles, 2016. "The Reluctant Defaulter: A Tale of High Government Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 11299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Karatas, B., 2014. "Financial crisis and monetary policy," Other publications TiSEM 41e463f0-e122-4379-8db5-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Fabrice Collard & Michel Habib & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2015. "Sovereign Debt Sustainability In Advanced Economies," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 381-420, June.
    10. Sosa-Padilla, César, 2018. "Sovereign defaults and banking crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 88-105.
    11. Charles Serfaty, 2022. "Sovereign Debt and International Trade," Working papers 901, Banque de France.
    12. Acharya, Viral V. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Shim, Jack B., 2024. "Reprint of “Sovereign debt and economic growth when government is myopic and self-interested”," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    13. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    14. Kuvshinov, Dmitry & Zimmermann, Kaspar, 2019. "Sovereigns going bust: Estimating the cost of default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-21.
    15. Guido Sandleris, 2016. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-27, April.
    16. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, 2013. "Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 85-117, July.
    17. Chen, Hsien-Yi & Chen, Sheng-Syan, 2018. "Quality of government institutions and spreads on sovereign credit default swaps," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 82-95.
    18. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    19. Sewon Hur & César Sosa-Padilla & Zeynep Yom, 2021. "Optimal bailouts in banking and sovereign crises," Working Papers 51, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    20. Aitor Erce, 2012. "Selective sovereign defaults," Globalization Institute Working Papers 127, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed015:240. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.