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Selective Sovereign Defaults

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  • Aitor Erce
  • Enrico Mallucci

Abstract

Governments issue debt both domestically and abroad. This heterogeneity introduces the possibility for governments to operate selective defaults that discriminate across investors. Using a novel dataset on the legal jurisdiction of sovereign defaults that distinguishes between defaults under domestic law and default under foreign law, we show that selectiveness is the norm and that imports, credit, and output dynamics are different around different types of default. Domestic defaults are associated with contractions of credit and are more likely in countries with smaller credit markets. In turn, external defaults, are associated with a sharp contraction of imports and are more likely in countries with depressed import markets. Based on these regularities, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that we calibrate to Argentina. We show that the model replicates well the behavior of the Argentinean economy and rationalizes these empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Aitor Erce & Enrico Mallucci, 2018. "Selective Sovereign Defaults," International Finance Discussion Papers 1239, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised Nov 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1239
    DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2018.1239
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    Cited by:

    1. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2020. "The price of haircuts: private and official default," Development Working Papers 460, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 06 Feb 2020.
    2. Adler, Gustavo & Lizarazo, Sandra, 2015. "Intertwined sovereign and bank solvencies in a simple model of self-fulfilling crisis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 428-448.
    3. Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "Towards more feasible sovereign debt restructurings in the euro area," EconPol Policy Reports 12, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    4. Bussière, M. & Ristiniemi, A., 2012. "Credit Ratings and Debt Crises," Working papers 396, Banque de France.
    5. Nathan Converse & Enrico Mallucci, 2019. "Differential Treatment in the Bond Market: Sovereign Risk and Mutual Fund Portfolios," International Finance Discussion Papers 1261, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 18 Oct 2019.
    6. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull & Cristina Arellano, 2013. "Partial Default," 2013 Meeting Papers 765, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Viral V. Acharya & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2013. "Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(6), pages 1526-1560.
    8. Broner, Fernando & Erce, Aitor & Martin, Alberto & Ventura, Jaume, 2014. "Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 114-142.
    9. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563, July.
    10. Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, 2013. "Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 247-272, May.
    11. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-law bonds: Can they reduce sovereign borrowing costs?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 164-179.
    12. Meyer, Josefin & Reinhart, Carmen M. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2019. "Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo," Working Paper Series rwp19-009, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Hideaki Matsuoka, 2020. "Debt intolerance: Threshold level and composition," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 014, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    14. Aitor Erce, 2014. "Banking on seniority: the IMF and the sovereign’s creditors," Globalization Institute Working Papers 175, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, revised 13 May 2014.
    15. David Beers & Patrisha de Leon-Manlagnit, 2019. "The BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database: What’s New in 2019?," Staff Working Papers 19-39, Bank of Canada.
    16. Fernando Broner & Aitor Erce & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2013. "Sovereign Debt Markets in Turbulent Times; Creditor Discrimination and Crowding-Out," IMF Working Papers 13/270, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Selective Defaults; Imports; External Debt; Domestic Debt; Sovereign Default; Credit;

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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