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Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Exclusion from International Capital Markets

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  • Dominik Thaler

Abstract

Why do governments borrow internationally? Why do they temporarily remain out of international financial markets after default? This paper develops a quantitative model of sovereign default to propose a unified answer to these questions. In the model, the government has an incentive to borrow internationally since the domestic return on capital exceeds the world interest rate, due to a friction in the banking sector. Since banks are exposed to sovereign debt, sovereign default causes a financial crisis. After default, the government chooses to reaccess international capital markets only once banks have recovered and efficiently allocate investment again. Exclusion hence arises endogenously.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominik Thaler, 2021. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Exclusion from International Capital Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1401-1427.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:131:y:2021:i:635:p:1401-1427.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueaa120
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    Cited by:

    1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Karataş, Bilge, 2023. "Three sisters: The interlinkage between sovereign debt, currency, and banking crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Sewon Hur & César Sosa-Padilla & Zeynep Yom, 2021. "Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises," Globalization Institute Working Papers 406, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, revised 27 Feb 2024.
    3. Apeti, Ablam Estel & Edoh, Eyah Denise, 2024. "Economic sanctions and sovereign debt default," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.
    5. Aitor Erce & Enrico Mallucci & Mattia Picarelli, 2021. "A Journey in the History of Sovereign Defaults on Domestic Law Public Debt," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 2106, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    6. Daniel A. Dias & Christine Richmond & Grant Westfahl, 2026. "Duration of Capital Market Exclusion: An Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 178-197, February.
    7. Dominik Thaler & Luis E. Rojas, 2020. "The Bright Side of the Doom Loop: Banks Exposure and Default Incentives," Working Papers 1143, Barcelona School of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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