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Sovereign Debt Workouts: Quo Vadis?

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Listed:
  • Danny Cassimon

    () (IOB, University of Antwerp)

  • Dennis Essers

    () (IOB, University of Antwerp)

  • Karel Verbeke

    () (IOB, University of Antwerp)

Abstract

The existing framework for sovereign debt workouts is often described as a ‘non-system’, a loose mix of Paris Club arrangements for official debts, voluntary renegotiations with commercial creditors, and more ambitious but, ultimately, temporary schemes for debt relief such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (which is now nearing its end). With sovereign debt crises looming in a range of countries, from advanced economies to former HIPCs, the question of how such crises should be confronted is again growing louder. Whereas most would agree that the current framework for sovereign debt workouts needs reform, opinions on the design of the reform diverge widely. This short paper outlines a number of initiatives that are currently under way or on the table and discusses their main advantages and drawbacks.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2017. "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Quo Vadis?," BeFinD Policy Briefs 4, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:nam:befdpb:4
    as

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    File URL: http://www.befind.be/publications/PBs/PB4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:nam:befdwp:3 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Benjamin Hébert & Jesse Schreger, 2014. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," Working Paper 223701, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-8.
    4. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563, July.
    5. Ugo Panizza, 2013. "Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion," IHEID Working Papers 03-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    6. Bardozzetti, Alfredo & Dottori, Davide, 2014. "Collective action clauses: How do they affect sovereign bond yields?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 286-303.
    7. Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2016. "The IMF-WB Debt Sustainability Framework: Procedures, Applications and Criticisms," BeFinD Policy Briefs 3, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    8. Hebert, Benjamin & Schreger, Jesse, 2016. "The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina," Research Papers 3456, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    9. Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2015. "What to do after the clean slate? Post-relief public debt sustainability and management," BeFinD Working Papers 0103, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    10. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.
    11. Gong Cheng & Javier Diaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce, 2017. "From Debt Collection to Relief Provision: 60 Years of Official Debt Restructurings through the Paris Club," Working Papers 20, European Stability Mechanism.
    12. Martin Brooke & Rhys R. Mendes & Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, 2013. "Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Discussion Papers 13-3, Bank of Canada.
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