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Sovereign Debt Workouts: Quo Vadis?

Author

Listed:
  • Danny Cassimon
  • Dennis Essers
  • Karel Verbeke

    (University of Antwerp)

Abstract

The existing framework for sovereign debt workouts is often described as a ‘non-system’, a loose mix of Paris Club arrangements for official debts, voluntary renegotiations with commercial creditors, and more ambitious but, ultimately, temporary schemes for debt relief such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (which is now nearing its end). With sovereign debt crises looming in a range of countries, from advanced economies to former HIPCs, the question of how such crises should be confronted is again growing louder. Whereas most would agree that the current framework for sovereign debt workouts needs reform, opinions on the design of the reform diverge widely. This short paper outlines a number of initiatives that are currently under way or on the table and discusses their main advantages and drawbacks.

Suggested Citation

  • Danny Cassimon & Dennis Essers & Karel Verbeke, 2018. "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Quo Vadis?," Africagrowth Agenda, Africagrowth Institute, vol. 15(3), pages 4-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:afj:journ2:v:15:y:2018:i:3:p:4-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.
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    5. Danny Cassimon & Karel Verbeke & Dennis Essers, 2017. "The IMF-WB Debt Sustainability Framework: Procedures, Applications and Criticisms," Development Finance Agenda, Chartered Institute of Development Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 4-6.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romain Houssa & Kelbesa Megersa, 2020. "Capacity Support for Domestic Revenue Mobilization - The case of Belgian development cooperation and partner countries," BeFinD Working Papers 0131, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    2. Danny Cassimon & George Mavrotas, 2021. "Development Finance in the Post-COVID-19 Era: Implications, Challenges and Opportunities," Africagrowth Agenda, Africagrowth Institute, vol. 18(1), pages 4-9.

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