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Waiting for a haircut? A bargaining perspective on sovereign debt restructuring

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Listed:
  • Ghosal, Sayantan
  • Miller, Marcus
  • Thampanishvong, Kannika

Abstract

Recent investigation of sovereign debt negotiations finds that prompt, market-friendly "reprofiling" often fails to achieve sustainability; but serious debt restructuring typically involves delay. We develop an incomplete information bargaining model to account for this, highlighting economic recovery and sustainability considerations as complementary reasons for delay. Some recent settlements are discussed, along with some policy implications of excessive profiling.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2016. "Waiting for a haircut? A bargaining perspective on sovereign debt restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 11710, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11710
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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    3. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
    4. Barr, David & Bush, Oliver & Pienkowski, Alex, 2014. "GDP-linked bonds and sovereign default," Bank of England working papers 484, Bank of England.
    5. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563, July.
    6. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
    8. Sturzenegger, Federico & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "Haircuts: Estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings, 1998-2005," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 780-805, September.
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    10. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2003. "Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 276-304, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; debt restructuring; delay; growth; sustainability;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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