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Real Effects of Financial Distress: The Role of Heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Sudipto Karmakar

    (Banco de Portugal)

  • Francisco Buera

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

Abstract

How severe are the real consequences of financial distress caused by sovereign debt crisis? What are the channels through which sovereign debt crisis affect banks and firms, and vice versa? Does firm heterogeneity matter? If yes, what are the important dimensions of heterogeneity? Using micro data from Portugal during the sovereign cri- sis starting in 2010, we address these questions. We make use of the Bank of Portugal’s detailed credit registry database together with bank and firm balance sheets and income statements to conduct this analysis. We first study the direct effect of the sovereign crisis on bank balance sheets by analyzing the differential impact on firms that had relations with banks who were more exposed to the sovereign (pre-crisis). We find that more fragile firms that had relations with more exposed banks contracted more than their counterparts. Specifically we find leverage and maturity structure of debt to be important dimensions of heterogeneity determining a firm’s fragility. Highly leveraged firms and those that had a larger share of short term debt contracted more during the sovereign debt crisis. We analyze firm performance on the basis of growth rate of employment, assets, liabilities and usage of intermediate commodities. We show that our findings are consistent with a simple model of leverage and maturity choice. We then document the spillover effects across firms that are mediated through the banking sector. To do this, we focus on the set of firms that were current on all their loans through the crisis, i.e., the set of performing firms. We find that performing firms that had relations with banks whose corporate loan balance sheet deteriorate by more were more affected by the sovereign crisis. Again, highly leveraged firms and those that had a larger share of short term debt contracted more during the sovereign debt crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Sudipto Karmakar & Francisco Buera, 2017. "Real Effects of Financial Distress: The Role of Heterogeneity," 2017 Meeting Papers 1356, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed017:1356
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    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Degryse, Hans & Karapetyan, Artashes & Karmakar, Sudipto, 2021. "To ask or not to ask? Bank capital requirements and loan collateralization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 239-260.
    3. Miguel H. Ferreira, 2023. "Aggregate Implications of Corporate Bond Holdings by Nonfinancial Firms," Working Papers 967, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    4. Ferreira, M. & Haber, T. & Rörig, C., 2021. "Financial Factors, Firm size and Firm Potential," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2176, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Gabriel, Ricardo Duque, 2024. "The Credit Channel of Public Procurement," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(S).
    6. Miguel H. Ferreira & Timo Haber & Christian Rörig, 2023. "Financial Constraints and Firm Size: Micro-Evidence and Aggregate Implications," Working Papers 948, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Neil Mehrotra, 2018. "Debt Sustainability in a Low Interest Rate World," 2018 Meeting Papers 285, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Hans Degryse & Artashes Karapetyan & Sudipto Karmakar, 2018. "To Ask or Not To Ask? Collateral versus Screening in Lending Relationships," Working Papers REM 2018/49, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    9. Madeira, Carlos, 2025. "The impact of financial crises on industrial growth in the Middle East and North Africa," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Bruno Albuquerque, 2024. "Corporate debt booms, financial constraints, and the investment nexus," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(5), pages 766-789, August.
    11. Bennouna, Hicham & Chmielewski, Tomasz & Doukali, Mohamed, 2019. "Monetary policy transmission in Morocco: Evidence from borrowers-level data," MPRA Paper 97086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Marianna Endrész, 2020. "The bank lending channel during financial turmoil," MNB Working Papers 2020/5, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    13. Hans Degryse & Artashes Karapetyan & Sudipto Karmakar, 2019. "To ask or not to ask: collateral vs screening in lending relationships," Bank of England working papers 778, Bank of England.
    14. repec:cam:camjip:2110 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Banerjee, Ryan N. & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Sette, Enrico, 2021. "The real effects of relationship lending✰," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    16. Farinha, Luísa & Spaliara, Marina-Eliza & Tsoukas, Serafeim, 2019. "Bank shocks and firm performance: New evidence from the sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    17. Nicolas Crouzet & Neil R. Mehrotra, 2018. "Small and Large Firms Over the Business Cycle," Working Papers 18-09, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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