IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/14113.html

Quantitative Sovereign Default Models and the European Debt Crisis

In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2018

Author

Listed:
  • Luigi Bocola
  • Gideon Bornstein
  • Alessandro Dovis

Abstract

A large literature has developed quantitative versions of the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model to analyze default episodes on external debt. In this paper, we study whether the same framework can be applied to the analysis of debt crises in which domestic public debt plays a prominent role. We consider a model where a government can issue debt to both domestic and foreign investors, and we derive conditions under which their sum is the relevant state variable for default incentives. We then apply our framework to the European debt crisis. We show that matching the cyclicality of public debt ---rather than that of external debt--- allows the model to better capture the empirical distribution of interest rate spreads and gives rise to more realistic crises dynamics.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Bocola & Gideon Bornstein & Alessandro Dovis, 2018. "Quantitative Sovereign Default Models and the European Debt Crisis," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2018, pages 20-30, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:14113
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Florent Kanga GBONGUE & Lambert N’Galadjo BAMBA, 2023. "Le modèle hybride de la structure par terme des primes souveraines de crédit et de liquidité dans la zone UEMOA," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 57, pages 101-145.
    3. Kobielarz, M.L., 2023. "Bailout dynamics in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    4. Michinao Okachi, 2019. "Sovereign Default Triggered by Inability to Repay Debt," IMES Discussion Paper Series 19-E-10, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    5. Nigmonov, Asror & Shams, Syed & Alam, Khorshed, 2022. "Macroeconomic determinants of loan defaults: Evidence from the U.S. peer-to-peer lending market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    6. Ding, Qian & Huang, Jianbai & Zhang, Hongwei, 2021. "The time-varying effects of financial and geopolitical uncertainties on commodity market dynamics: A TVP-SVAR-SV analysis," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    7. Poshakwale, Sunil & Aghanya, Daniel & Agarwal, Vineet, 2020. "The impact of regulations on compliance costs, risk-taking, and reporting quality of the EU banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Daniel, Betty C. & Nam, Jinwook, 2022. "The Greek debt crisis: Excusable vs. strategic default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    9. Charles Serfaty, 2024. "Sovereign Default and International Trade," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 72(4), pages 1449-1501, December.
    10. Prein, Timm, 2019. "Persistent Unemployment, Sovereign Debt Crises, and the Impact of Haircuts," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203654, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2019.
    11. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    12. Moreno Badia, Marialuz & Medas, Paulo & Gupta, Pranav & Xiang, Yuan, 2022. "Debt is not free," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    13. Radoslaw Paluszynski & Georgios Stefanidis, 2023. "Borrowing into debt crises," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), pages 277-308, January.
    14. Cuadros-Solas, Pedro Jesús & Salvador Muñoz, Carlos, 2022. "Disentangling the sources of sovereign rating adjustments: An examination of changes in rating policies following the GFC," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    15. Nigmonov, Asror & Shams, Syed & Urbonas, Povilas, 2024. "Estimating probability of default via delinquencies? Evidence from European P2P lending market," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    16. Bernardo Guimaraes & Lucas Tumkus, 2020. "On the costs of sovereign default in quantitative models," Discussion Papers 2021, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    17. Giancarlo Corsetti, 2023. "Debt crises, fast and slow Giancarlo," RSCAS Working Papers 2023/15, European University Institute.
    18. Aneta Hryckiewicz & Petra Pawlowski & Piotr Michal Mazur & Marcin Borsukb, 2022. "Sovereign Debt Holding and Bank Sensitivity toward Market Risk: An Alternative View of the Bank–Sovereign Problem," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(5), pages 1-52, December.
    19. Kaldorf, Matthias & Röttger, Joost, 2023. "Convenient but risky government bonds," Discussion Papers 15/2023, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    20. Thomas J. Sargent & John Stachurski, 2024. "Dynamic Programming: Finite States," Papers 2401.10473, arXiv.org.
    21. Liu, Yan & Marimon, Ramon & Wicht, Adrien, 2023. "Making sovereign debt safe with a financial stability fund," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    22. Giovanni Callegari & Ramon Marimon & Adrien Wicht & Luca Zavalloni, 2023. "On a Lender of Last Resort with a Central Bank and a Stability Fund," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 106-130, October.
    23. Vera Ivanyuk, 2023. "Development of an Econometric Model of Crisis and Assessment of the Crisis Risk," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-29, November.
    24. Joao Ayres & Gaston Navarro & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Pedro Teles, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises with Long Stagnations," Working Papers 757, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:14113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.