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Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations

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  • Holger M. Mueller
  • Thomas Philippon

Abstract

Using firm-, industry-, and country-level data, we document a link between family ownership and labor relations. Across countries, we find that family ownership is relatively more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are difficult, consistent with firm-level evidence suggesting that family firms are particularly effective at coping with difficult labor relations. Our cross-country results are robust to controlling for minority shareholder protection and various other potential determinants of family ownership. Our results also hold if we use strike data from the 1960s to predict cross-country variation in family ownership thirty years later. We address causality in two ways. First, we instrument our measure of the quality of labor relations using 'Labor Origin', a variable describing the extent to which the emerging European liberal states in the 18th and 19th centuries confronted guilds and labor organizations. Second, making use of within-country variation at the industry level, we show that - controlling for industry and country fixed effects - industries that are more labor dependent have relatively more family ownership in countries with worse labor relations.

Suggested Citation

  • Holger M. Mueller & Thomas Philippon, 2006. "Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations," NBER Working Papers 12739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12739
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Thinking about family firms
      by noreply@blogger.com (Ryan Decker) in Updated priors on 2015-04-20 21:00:00

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Belloc, Marianna & Pagano, Ugo, 2009. "Co-evolution of politics and corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 106-114, June.
    2. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    3. Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, 2008. "Politics-Business Interaction Paths," Working Papers in Public Economics 109, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    4. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
    5. Royston Greenwood & Amalia Magán Díaz & Stan Xiao Li & José Céspedes Lorente, 2010. "The Multiplicity of Institutional Logics and the Heterogeneity of Organizational Responses," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(2), pages 521-539, April.
    6. Morck Randall, 2008. "Comment on "Family Values or Crony Capitalism?" (Harold James)," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7, June.
    7. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2012. "Корпоративные Конфликты И Политика Фирм В Области Занятости И Заработной Платы [Corporate Governance Conflicts and Employment and Wage Policies of Companies]," MPRA Paper 40215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. David Marsden, 2021. "Patterns of organizational ownership and employee well‐being in Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 59(4), pages 988-1019, December.
    9. Rui Albuquerue & Neng Wang, 2008. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, February.
    10. Siebert, W. Stanley & Peng, Fei & Maimaiti, Yasheng, 2011. "HRM Practices and Performance of Family-Run Workplaces: Evidence from the 2004 WERS," IZA Discussion Papers 5899, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi, 2009. "Trust, Inequality And The Size Of The Co‐Operative Sector: Cross‐Country Evidence," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(2), pages 165-195, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

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