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Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing

  • Rui Albuquerque
  • Neng Wang

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13251.

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Date of creation: Jul 2007
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Publication status: published as Rui Albuquerue & Neng Wang, 2008. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, 02.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13251
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