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Corporate governance over the business cycle

I provide empirical evidence that badly governed firms respond more to aggregate shocks than do well governed firms. I build a simple model where managers are prone to over-invest and where shareholders are more willing to tolerate such a behavior in good times. The model successfully explains the average profit differences as well as the cyclical behavior of sales, employment and investment for firms with different governance qualities. The quantitative results suggest that governance conflicts can explain 30% of aggregate volatility

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 30 (2006)
Issue (Month): 11 (November)
Pages: 2117-2141

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:30:y:2006:i:11:p:2117-2141
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

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