IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp11788.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Impact of Employment Protection on the Industrial Wage Structure

Author

Listed:
  • Heywood, John S.

    () (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)

  • O'Mahony, Mary

    (King's College London)

  • Siebert, W. Stanley

    () (University of Birmingham)

  • Rincon-Aznar, Ana

    (National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR))

Abstract

This paper tests whether the job security offered by stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) undermines positive compensating wage differentials that would otherwise be paid. Specifically, we ask whether industries with relatively more need for layoffs and labour flexibility have lower wages in countries where stricter EPL protects workers from layoffs. We find this generally to be true for a large sample of industries in the major OECD countries over 1984-2005, particularly for wages of unskilled workers. However, we also find that where workers are well organised, they can take advantage of EPL to secure higher wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Heywood, John S. & O'Mahony, Mary & Siebert, W. Stanley & Rincon-Aznar, Ana, 2018. "The Impact of Employment Protection on the Industrial Wage Structure," IZA Discussion Papers 11788, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11788
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11788.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrea Bassanini & Luca Nunziata & Danielle Venn, 2009. "Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 24, pages 349-402, April.
    2. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June.
    3. Emilia Del Bono & Andrea Weber, 2008. "Do Wages Compensate for Anticipated Working Time Restrictions? Evidence from Seasonal Employment in Austria," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26, pages 181-221.
    4. van der Wiel, Karen, 2010. "Better protected, better paid: Evidence on how employment protection affects wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 16-26, January.
    5. Duncan, Greg J & Holmlund, Bertil, 1983. "Was Adam Smith Right after All? Another Test of the Theory of Compensating Wage Differentials," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(4), pages 366-379, October.
    6. Böckerman, Petri & Ilmakunnas, Pekka & Johansson, Edvard, 2011. "Job security and employee well-being: Evidence from matched survey and register data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 547-554, August.
    7. Prabirjit Sarkar, 2013. "Does an employment protection law lead to unemployment? A panel data analysis of OECD countries, 1990–2008," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(6), pages 1335-1348.
    8. repec:bla:coecpo:v:35:y:2017:i:3:p:421-438 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2016. "Human capital, employment protection and growth in Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 213-230.
    10. Bjuggren, Carl Magnus, 2018. "Employment protection and labor productivity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 138-157.
    11. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 2007. "The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 39-72.
    12. Bassanini, Andrea & Garnero, Andrea, 2013. "Dismissal protection and worker flows in OECD countries: Evidence from cross-country/cross-industry data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 25-41.
    13. Gianmarco León & Edward Miguel, 2013. "Transportation Choices and the Value of Statistical Life," NBER Working Papers 19494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Pedro S. Martins, 2009. "Dismissals for Cause: The Difference That Just Eight Paragraphs Can Make," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 257-279, April.
    15. Eve Caroli & Mathilde Godard, 2016. "Does job insecurity deteriorate health?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(2), pages 131-147, February.
    16. Hwang, Hae-shin & Reed, W Robert & Hubbard, Carlton, 1992. "Compensating Wage Differentials and Unobserved Productivity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 835-858, August.
    17. Inklaar, Robert & Timmer, Marcel P., 2008. "GGDC Productivity Level Database: International Comparisons of Output, Inputs and Productivity at the Industry Level," GGDC Research Memorandum GD-104, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen.
    18. Azizjon Alimov, 2015. "Labor Protection Laws and Bank Loan Contracting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 37-74.
    19. Edward P. Lazear, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726.
    20. Mary O'Mahony & Marcel P. Timmer, 2009. "Output, Input and Productivity Measures at the Industry Level: The EU KLEMS Database," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages 374-403, June.
    21. Pierre Cahuc & Olivier Charlot & Franck Malherbet, 2016. "Explaining The Spread Of Temporary Jobs And Its Impact On Labor Turnover," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 533-572, May.
    22. repec:bla:labour:v:31:y:2017:i:4:p:415-432 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Moretti, Enrico, 2000. "Do Wages Compensate for Risk of Unemployment? Parametric and Semiparametric Evidence from Seasonal Jobs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 45-66, January.
    24. Bryson, Alex & Barth, Erling & Dale-Olsen, Harald, 2012. "Do higher wages come at a price?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 251-263.
    25. Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, 2013. "Who Pays for it? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1236-1278, December.
    26. repec:dgr:rugggd:gd-104 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Danielle Venn, 2009. "Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 89, OECD Publishing.
    28. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 553-584, July.
    29. Topel, Robert H, 1984. "Equilibrium Earnings, Turnover, and Unemployment: New Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 500-522, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment protection legislation; labour regulation; compensating wage differentials; education and inequality; labour organisation; layoffs;

    JEL classification:

    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11788. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak). General contact details of provider: http://www.iza.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.