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Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment Protection Indicators

  • Danielle Venn

This paper presents updated estimates of the OECD employment protection indicators for 30 OECD countries and 10 emerging economies and considers important aspects of employment protection other than those provided in legislation. Collective agreements often contain provisions relating to employment protection, but in most OECD countries, severance pay and notice periods in collective agreements are similar to those set out in legislation. Where bargaining takes place largely outside individual firms at the national, regional or sectoral level and collective agreements include provisions substantially more generous to employees than those in legislation, they are incorporated into the OECD indicators. Many OECD countries exempt some groups of firms or workers from employment protection rules. Such exemptions have mixed success in promoting employment among exempted groups, but do not have a large impact on the accuracy of the OECD indicators. More than half of OECD countries have specialised courts or procedures to handle unfair dismissal cases, reducing the time taken to deal with cases and improving satisfaction with legal outcomes. Resolving disputes early (either through pre-court dispute resolution procedures or pre-trial conciliation) saves time and money compared with waiting for a court decision. More research and cross-country comparable data are needed on the efficiency of conciliation procedures and the cost of pursuing or defending dismissal cases. Cet article présente la mise à jour des estimations des indicateurs de la protection de l’emploi de l’OCDE pour 30 pays de l’OCDE et 10 pays émergents et examine les aspects important de la protection de l’emploi, autres que celles prévues dans la législation. Les conventions collectives comportent souvent des dispositions relatives à la protection de l’emploi, mais dans la plupart des pays de l’OCDE, les indemnités de cessation d’emploi et les délais de préavis prévus par les conventions collectives sont comparables à ceux stipulés par la législation. Lorsque la négociation collective se situe au niveau de la branche, au niveau régional ou au niveau national, et que les conventions collectives intègrent des dispositions sensiblement plus généreuses pour les salariés que celles inscrites dans la législation, il en est tenu compte dans les indicateurs de protection de l’emploi de l’OCDE. De nombreux pays de l’OCDE exemptent certains groupes d'entreprises ou de travailleurs de la protection de l'emploi. Ces dérogations ont un succès mitigé dans la promotion de l'emploi parmi les groupes exemptés, mais ils n'ont pas un grand impact sur la précision des indicateurs de l'OCDE. Plus de la moitié des pays de l’OCDE ont des juridictions ou des procédures spécialisées pour traiter les affaires de licenciement abusif, qui facilitent l’accès à la justice, réduisent les délais de procédure et améliorent la satisfaction quant aux résultats. Résoudre les conflits précocement (soit par des procédures précontentieuses de règlement des litiges, soit par une conciliation au stade de la mise en état) permet d’économiser du temps et de l’argent plutôt que d’avoir à attendre la décision d’une juridiction. Il reste cependant nécessaire d’entreprendre des travaux de recherche supplémentaires et de collectes de donnés, plus facilement comparable d’un pays à l’autre, sur l’efficacité des procédures de conciliation et les coûts associés à la présentation ou à la défense d’un cas de licenciement devant les tribunaux.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/223334316804
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Paper provided by OECD Publishing in its series OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers with number 89.

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Date of creation: 02 Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:oec:elsaab:89-en
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