A discrete model of discriminatory price auctions - an alternative to Menezes-Monteiro
Menezes and Monteiro, Math. Soc. Sci. (1995), show that a multi-unit discriminatory price auction does not have a pure strategy equilibrium unless one imposes some rather special conditions on the demand functions. This non-existence result might indicate a problem either with the underlying auction procedure (as Menezes and Monteiro suggest) or with the modelling approach (as we suggest). We observe that the non-existence problem disappears if bids must come in multiples of smallest units --- a realistic feature. Moreover, we show that most of the analysis can be recast in a discrete action model.
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- V.V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, 1992. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 3-12.
- Menezes F. M. & Monteiro, P. K., 1996.
"Existence of equilibrium in a descriminatory price auction,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-61, February.
- Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 1995. "Existence of equilibrium in a discriminatory price auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 285-292, December.
- Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
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