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Just How Big Is the Too Big to Fail Problem?

Author

Listed:
  • Barth, James R.

    (Auburn University and University of PA)

  • Prabha, Apanard

    (Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA)

  • Swagel, Phillip

    (MD School of Public Policy and Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA)

Abstract

The idea of banks too big to fail (TBTF) is not new. Indeed, it has been three decades since the first TBTF bailout due to concerns about serious and widespread financial repercussions. Since then, of course, big banks have grown much bigger and have become increasingly complex, both in the United States and elsewhere. In this paper, we put the issue of too big to fail in U.S. historical and quantitative perspective, and assess the potential impacts of recent regulatory changes. The developments relating to the TBTF problem based on a global perspective are also examined. The measures taken since the financial crisis of 2007-2009-including the Basel III regulatory reforms, domestic regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act, and the designation of global systemically important banks-have distinct purposes but also complement one another, to the extent that they are successful. Our analysis points out that despite the recent regulatory changes the future of TBTF remains unclear, but it is likely that it will be different from the past.

Suggested Citation

  • Barth, James R. & Prabha, Apanard & Swagel, Phillip, 2012. "Just How Big Is the Too Big to Fail Problem?," Working Papers 12-06, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:upafin:12-06
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    File URL: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/12/12-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

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    2. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 2020. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 197-211, September.
    3. Philip E. Strahan, 2013. "Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 43-61, November.
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    5. Del Viva, Luca & Kasanen, Eero & Saunders, Anthony & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 2021. "Is bailout insurance and tail risk priced in bank equities?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    6. Ozili, Peterson K, 2022. "Difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability," MPRA Paper 115783, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 0. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 0, pages 1-15.
    8. Lapteacru, Ion, 2017. "Market power and risk of Central and Eastern European banks: Does more powerful mean safer?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 46-59.
    9. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Song, Liang & Yeung, Bernard, 2015. "What determines bank-specific variations in bank stock returns? Global evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 312-324.
    10. TROKHYMENKO Viktoriia, 2014. "Banks Too Big To Fail: Causes, Contradictions And Consequences," Revista Economica, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 66(2), pages 127-140.
    11. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
    12. ap Gwilym, Rhys & Kanas, Angelos & Molyneux, Philip, 2013. "U.S. prompt corrective action and bank risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 239-257.
    13. Badarau, Cristina & Lapteacru, Ion, 2020. "Bank risk, competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    14. Kaufman, George G., 2014. "Too big to fail in banking: What does it mean?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 214-223.
    15. Moutsianas, Konstantinos A. & Kosmidou, Kyriaki, 2016. "Bank earnings volatility in the UK: Does size matter? A comparison between commercial and investment banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 137-150.
    16. Satish Thosar & Bradley Schwandt, 2019. "Has ‘Too Big To Fail’ Been Solved? A Longitudinal Analysis of Major U.S. Banks," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-14, February.
    17. Gao, Yu & Liao, Scott & Wang, Xue, 2018. "Capital markets’ assessment of the economic impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on systemically important financial firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 204-223.
    18. Kozubovska, Mariolia, 2017. "Breaking up big banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 198-219.
    19. Maria Celia López-Penabad & Ana Iglesias-Casal & José Fernando Silva Neto, 2021. "Competition and Financial Stability in the European Listed Banks," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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